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ABSTRACT 
It has been noted by public that corruption is a practice that can be considered an extra or-
dinary crime that has happened in developing countries. Such a common misuse of public 
affair is conducted for private gain, including but not limited to: corruption, nepotism, brib-
ery, extortion, influence peddling and fraud. In Indonesia, corruption has been around for 
years and increased dramatically in recent years. It distorts markets and the allocation of 
resources. This research examines the Granger causal relationship between corruption and 
poverty with panel data of 9 ASEAN countries during the period of observation 2005-2009. It 
uses the generalized method of moments/dynamic panel data (GMM/DPD) and focuses on 
capability poverty using human development index (HDI). The major results show that pov-
erty does not affect corruption meanwhile corruption causes poverty. There is unidirectional 
causality, from corruption to poverty.  
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HUBUNGAN KAUSALITAS ANTARA KORUPSI DAN KEMISKINAN DI 
ASEAN: GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS/ 
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA 
ABSTRAK 
Telah menjadi kenyataan bagi masyarakat bahwa korupsi adalah praktik yang dapat diang-
gap sebagai kejahatan luar biasa yang telah terjadi di negara-negara berkembang. Seperti 
penyalahgunaan urusan dinas bagi publik dilakukan untuk kepentingan pribadi, termasuk 
dan tidak terbatas pada: korupsi, nepotisme, suap, pemerasan menjajakan, pengaruh dan 
penipuan. Di Indonesia, korupsi telah ada selama bertahun-tahun dan meningkat secara 
dramatis dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Kondisi seperti ini bisa merusak pasar dan alokasi 
sumber daya. Penelitian ini menguji hubungan kausal Granger antara korupsi dan kemiski-
nan dengan data dari 9 negara ASEAN selama periode pengamatan 2005-2009. Penelitian 
ini menggunakan the generalized method of moments/dynamic panel data (GMM/DPD) dan 
berfokus pada capability poverty dengan menggunakan indeks pembangunan manusia (IPM). 
Hasil openelitian ini enunjukkan bahwa kemiskinan tidak mempengaruhi korupsi sementara 
korupsilah yang menyebabkan kemiskinan. Ada hubungan kausalitas satu arah, dari korupsi 
terhadap kemiskinan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Korupsi, Kemiskinan, Analisis Data Panel, Kausalitas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, an extra ordinary crime, is a 
kind of everlasting developing countries’ 
problem. It is commonly defined as the mis-
use of public affair for private gain, includ-
ing but not limited to: corruption, nepotism, 
bribery, extortion, influence peddling and 
fraud (Chetwynd et al. 2003). In Indonesia, 
corruption has been around for years and 
increased dramatically in recent years. It 
distorts markets and the allocation of re-
sources (Tanzi 1998). A simple question is 
sometimes addressed: who is the poor? The 
answers to this question are still debatable.  
There are some definitions of poor peo-
ple. However, defining poverty is a matter of 
social convention (Pradhan 2000:2). An ac-
cepted definition of poverty, unlike the pres-
ence of its real problem, is somehow hard to 
define. There are a lot of definitions of pov-
erty which can be used to different countries 
or regions and at all times, independent of 
the social structure and level of development 
(Meier 1995:26). Some would go into a 
pragmatic conclusion by looking at poverty 
as merely contextual and cannot be concep-
tualized since the notion of ‘being poor’ or 
‘feeling poor’ can be very subjective. How-
ever, for analytical and policy purposes, a 
rigorous definition is necessary.  
In Indonesia, there have been at least 
three definitions of poverty in most highly 
publicized research. The first one was the 
official measurement from the Indonesian 
Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Sta-
tistik, BPS). The second one was a meas-
urement proposed by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). The third 
measurement was published by the World 
Bank, SMERU – a non-governmental or-
ganization funded by the World Bank – and 
a joint study by RAND Graduate School and 
Demographic Institute, Faculty of Econom-
ics, University of Indonesia.  
Poverty is obviously about more than in-
sufficient income. It is also related to the 
access to and quality of public services vital 
to the poor such as health, education, water, 
infrastructures and sanitation. It is also about 
lack of opportunities, lack of access to in-
formation, lack of voice and lack of repre-
sentation. The relationship between corrup-
tion and poverty is complex. In macroeco-
nomic level, corruption affects poverty 
through lowering, economic growth, reduc-
ing foreign and domestic investment, distort-
ing market, hindering competition, and in-
creasing income inequalities (Chetwynd et 
al. 2003).  
Corruption is likely to increase poverty 
because it reduces the potential income earn-
ing of the poor. Therefore, eradicating cor-
ruption is a crucial issue in the poverty re-
duction process. Alternatively, poverty 
which is usually indicated by low income, 
low education and health, vulnerability and 
powerlessness, invites corruption. Social and 
income inequalities in poor countries make 
greater imbalances in the distribution of 
power and encourage corruption (Ndiku-
mana 2006). A rational agent will be corrupt 
as long as the private income gained from 
corruption is equal or outweighs its private 
cost, because it will improve his/her welfare 
(Yaru and Aminu 2009).  
While many studies have examined the 
relationship between corruption and poverty, 
the question of whether a causal relationship 
exist between corruption and poverty based 
on panel data models, has received less atten-
tion. Thus, the policy recommendation for 
combating poverty and corruption can simply 
be wrong. Taking it into the limit, particularly 
for ASEAN countries, how good they try to 
decrease corruption by implementing anti 
poverty strategies if the high poverty level 
simply caused by high corruption and not the 
other way around. As we know, most of 
countries joined in ASEAN (Association of 
the South East Asia Nations) are developing 
countries. Based on the Survey of Transpar-
ency International Corruption Perception In-
dex (CPI) in 2009, the ASEAN countries ex-
cept Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Ma-
laysia, placed on the group of worst level of 
the corrupted countries in the world. This 
paper intends to examine the Granger causal 
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relationship between corruption and poverty 
by a panel data of 9 ASEAN countries from 
2005 to 2009, the period of ASEAN-Free 
Trade Area (AFTA).  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS  
Poverty is not the same as inequality. Whe-
reas poverty is related to the absolute stan-
dard of living of a part of society of the 
poor, inequality refers to relative living 
standard across the whole society. At maxi-
mum inequality, poverty is high. In contrast, 
minimum inequality is possible with zero 
poverty (where no one is poor) as well as 
with maximum poverty (where all are poor). 
The perception of poverty has changed tre-
mendously and evolved historically from 
culture to culture. Criteria for determining 
poor and non-poor tend to express particular 
national priorities and normative concepts of 
welfare and rights. It is common that as 
countries become wealthier, their perception 
of the acceptable poverty line changes. 
What is poverty? A simple definition of 
poverty is the inability to attain a minimal 
standard of living (Meier 1995:26). Simi-
larly, it is the inability of an individual or a 
family to command sufficient resources to 
satisfy basic needs (Fields 1993: 88). It de-
livers a commonly shared idea of poverty as 
a state of deprivation. Despite giving a gen-
eral idea, such definition also provides more 
issues to explore. This opens the room for 
some possible approaches in discussing pov-
erty. 
Studies on the causal relationship be-
tween corruption and poverty have been car-
ried out intensively. Basically, there are two 
competing theories in exploring such a link-
age. The first theory argues that corruption 
affects poverty but not the other way around. 
There is unidirectional causality from cor-
ruption to poverty. Corruption affects the 
poor directly since it increases the cost of 
public services, lowers quality of public ser-
vices and often restricts poor people’s access 
to public services (health, education, etc).  
Corruption also indirectly affects the 
poor because corruption is an impediment to 
economic growth, distorts public expendi-
ture allocation, etc. In contrast to the first 
theory, the second theory points out that cor-
ruption and poverty go together, with bidi-
rectional causality. Study by Gupta et al. 
(1998) provides some theoretical framework 
showing that corruption increases income 
inequality and poverty such as reduced eco-
nomic growth; biased tax systems favoring 
the rich and well connected; poor targeting 
of social programs; the use of wealth by the 
well to do to lobby government for favorable 
policies that perpetuate inequality in asset 
ownership and lower social spending.  
The relationship between corruption and 
income inequality also arises from rent-
seeking theory and the ideas of Rose-
Ackerman (1978). Lambsdorff (1999) ar-
gues that the benefits from corruption are 
likely to accrue to the well-connected at the 
expense of the poor. According to Gupta et 
al. (1998), corruption increases income ine-
quality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
In a cross section of 37 countries, a signifi-
cant positive impact of corruption on ine-
quality was found, while taking into account 
various other exogenous variables. When 
controlling GDP per head, this impact re-
mains significant at 10% level. It was con-
cluded that deterioration in a country’s cor-
ruption index of 2.5 points on a scale of 0 to 
10 is associated to the same increase in the 
Gini coefficient as a reduction in average 
secondary schooling of 2.3 years. 
N’zue and N’Guessan (2006) also inves-
tigated the direction of causality between 
poverty and corruption by using a panel of 
18 countries during the 1996-2001 time pe-
riods. The empirical evidence shows that 
poverty measured by Human Development 
Index (HDI) does not cause corruption and 
corruption does not cause poverty. When the 
poverty measured by income inequality, the 
results show uni-directional causality. That 
is, inequality does not cause corruption but 
corruption causes inequality. On the oppo-
site, Negin et al. (2010) investigate the 
Granger causal relationship between corrup-
ISSN 2087-3735 The Causal Relationship … (Ina Purwantini Rahayu) 
530 
tion and poverty.  
Based on a sample of 97 developing 
countries during 1997-2006, their empirical 
findings reveal that corruption and poverty 
are along together, with bidirectional causal-
ity. In their study, the poverty was measured 
by Human Poverty Index (HPI). You and 
Khagram (2005) provide evidence that in-
come inequality also raises the level of mate-
rial corruption, as well as normative mecha-
nisms. Their analysis of 129 countries using 
2-SLS methods with difference of 3 instru-
mental variables supports their hypotheses 
using different measures of corruption. Be-
cause income inequality also contributes to 
corruption, societies often fall into vicious 
circles of inequality and corruption. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This research uses the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator to examine the 
Granger causality between corruption and 
poverty by controlling the potential bias that 
may come from endogeneity of some repres-
sors, including the lagged dependent vari-
able. Our basic specification is in the follow-
ing form: 
∑ ∑ ∑
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In such model, the causality-based vari-
ables comprise x and y in which each cor-
ruption and poverty. Major control variables 
(z) act as mediator between corruption and 
poverty namely inflation and gender. Then, 
uit is an error term. In panel estimation, nei-
ther the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
estimator nor the Fixed Effect (FE) estimator 
will produce consistent estimates in the 
presence of endogenous and dynamics re-
gressors (Baltagi 1995). Arellano and Bond 
(1991) have proposed a dynamic panel Gen-
eral Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
with an instrument variable (IV) estimator 
that uses all past values of endogenous re-
gressors as well as current values of strictly 
exogenous regressors. Estimates can be 
based on first difference, or on orthogonal 
deviations.  
Arellano-Bond estimation takes the first 
step by transforming all regressors, usually 
through differentiation and uses the General-
ized Method of Moments to be called as dif-
ference GMM. The Arellano-Bover/Blun-
dell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-
Bond by making an additional assumption, 
that first differences of instrument variables 
are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This 
allows the introduction of more instruments, 
and can dramatically improve efficiency. It 
builds a system of two equations-the original 
equation as well as the transformed one- and 
is known as system GMM. It is preferred to 
difference GMM since finite sample bias 
problem caused by weak instruments in first 
differenced GMM will be addressed by us-
ing system GMM. It also offers forward or-
thogonal deviations, an alternative to differ-
encing that preserves sample size in panels 
with gaps. It allows finer control over the 
instrument matrix. 
 
Data and Variable Definitions 
The researcher analyzes the link between 
corruption and poverty based on a panel of 9 
ASEAN countries for the 2005 to 2009 time 
periods. The data were obtained from the 
Transparency International, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), World 
Bank and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). To 
measure corruption, this study uses the 
Transparency International corruption per-
ception index (CPI). The data is yearly and 
scored from 0 to 10, where zero means high-
er corruption. Ten refers to a corruption-free 
country. Table 1 shows the CPI scores of 9 
ASEAN countries for 2005-2009 provided 
by Transparency International. 
To measure poverty, the researcher used 
the Human Development Index (HDI) pub-
lished by UNDP. This HDI represents indi-
cators such as education and adult literacy, 
life expectancy and household income to 
come up with an indexed score to show 
where moreover 150 countries fall on the 
development spectrum (high, medium or 
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low). Moreover, the data on consumption 
and income could not truly capture the state 
of poverty in the countries being studied. We 
focus on capability poverty using Human 
Development Index (HDI) since it portrays 
in a more accurate way the state of poverty. 
To assess the correlation between cor-
ruption and poverty, the researcher puts Zi 
variables which consist of inflation rate and 
gender. Inflation, as one of the aspects of 
macroeconomic instability, is a regressive 
tax, which its burden is especially carried by 
those in lower income groups since the poor 
tend to hold most of their wealth in the form 
of cash, and also they are commonly less 
able than the rich to secure the real value of 
their incomes and wealth from inflation 
(Negin et al. 2010). Therefore, price in-
creases generally erode the real wages and 
assets of the poor more than those that be-
long to the rich.  
Higher cost of monitoring the agent is 
generated by agent behavior in inflating the 
price of goals which is required to start an 
investment project. So it causes higher cor-
ruption and lower investment (Braun and Di 
Tella 2000). Gender is considered as one of 
control variables. Women’s participation in 
public sector reduces corruption in business 
and government. Several studies show that 
in countries whit high gender equality, the 
level of corruption is lower (Dollar and Gatti 
1999). Those aspects conform to the com-
parative studies the comparative study 
among countries with the same civil liber-
ties, education, legal institutions, and GDP. 
Then, in order to lower the level of corrup-
tion, it may be better to design policies to 
improve the role of women in public life. 
Gender disparities are not only inequitable 
but also have economic consequences such 
as slowing down growth and increasing pov-
erty. Evidences show that growth and social 
development significantly affects poverty 
outcomes. It means that for ultra-poor 
households, women have crucial role to pre-
vent increasing their poverty (Negin et al. 
2010). 
Alatas et al. (2007) also explores behav-
ioral differences by gender across countries 
and find that there are larger variations in 
women’s behavior towards corruption than 
in men’s across the countries in our sample. 
Bowman and Giligan (2008) examine the 
possible relationship between gender and 
perceptions of corruption within Australia. 
Their study suggests that, in general, Austra-
lian women appear to be less tolerant of cor-
rupt scenarios than their male counterparts, 
although gender difference was not auto-
matic across all scenarios. The results sug-
gest that it seems gender dimension with 
respect to perceptions of corruption. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The Granger causality between corruption 
and poverty is explored by using two steps 
GMM method with t-values and test statis-
tics that are asymptotically robust to general 
heteroscedasticity and corrected for a small 
Table 1 
Corruption Perception Index 
 
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Cambodia 1.5 2.3 2.1 2 1.8 
Indonesia 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 
Lao PDR 3.4 3.3 2.6 1.9 2.0 
Malaysia  5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.5 
Myanmar 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.3 
Philippines 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 
Singapore 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.2 
Thailand 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.4 
Vietnam 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 
Source: Transparency International. 
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sample bias. To investigate Granger causal-
ity relationship between corruption and pov-
erty, two cases are considered: (i) corruption 
does not Granger-cause poverty, and (ii) 
poverty does not Granger-cause corruption. 
The empirical results of the poverty eq-
uations are presented in Table 2 where each 
column presents different specifications of 
the poverty equation. In all models the inter-
est variable is corruption. In specification 1, 
there is no control variable; in specification 
2, gender (female labor force participation 
rate) is used as a control variable. In specifi-
cation 3, inflation is added to gender as the 
other control variable. Since all other regres-
sors in these models are not strictly exoge-
nous, in all specification, year dummies and 
levels equation are used as instrument vari-
ables. For all specifications, the lags length 
of corruption is two and the lags length of 
dependent variable (poverty) is one. The 
results in all specifications suggest that there 
is a significant relationship between corrup-
tion and poverty. 
In specification 2 and 3, the coefficient 
of gender is positive and significant (at 1% 
level and 5% level, respectively) indicating 
that women have crucial role either to pre-
Table 2 
 The Estimated Results from the Two Step Dynamic Panel GMM-SYS 
(Effects of Corruption on Poverty) 
 
Dependent log(HDI)t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
log(HDI)t-1 1.227 
(7.13)*** 
1.411 
(13.86)*** 
1.66 
(10.44)*** 
log(CPI)t -0.057 
(-1.38) 
-0.052 
(-2.19)** 
0.13 
(1.48)* 
log(CPI)t-1 0.138 
(2.07)** 
0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.019 
(-0.57) 
log(CPI)t-2 -0.122 
(-2.15)** 
-0.013 
(-0.55) 
0.025 
(1.37) 
log(Gender)t  3.201 
(4.35)*** 
4.13 
(2.40)** 
Inflation 
 
  -82.38 
(-3.01)*** 
dummy2005 
 
   
dummy2006 
 
   
dummy2007 
 
   
Dummy2008 -3937.085 
(15.03)*** 
-5122.649 
(-15.96)*** 
-4653.215 
(-6.62)*** 
Dummy2009 701.3394 
(2.41)** 
1517.382 
(7.08)*** 
1957.230 
(2.69)** 
 
 
   
No. Observation 100 100 100 
Sargan test, (p value) 4.906 3.138 2.628 
Instrument rank 11 11 11 
Notes: All models are estimated Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations. Figures 
in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent 
level and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Volume 15, No. 3, December 2012, pages 527 – 536 
Accreditation No. 80/DIKTI/Kep/2012 
533 
vent poverty or to increase society welfare. 
The result is consistent to Subbarao and 
Ezemenari (1995) and Negin et al. (2010). 
The inflation has a statistically significant 
negative effect (1% level) on human devel-
opment index in the specification 3 which is 
consistent with Ames et al. (2002) and Ne-
gin et al. (2010).  
Two types of diagnostic test are used for 
validity of the empirical models; they are 
Sargan test and Instrument Rank. Those tests 
identify restrictions under the null hypothe-
sis of the validity of the instruments (Arella-
no and Bond 1991). Based on the Sargan test 
statistic for all models, high p-value indi-
cates that the null hypothesis of no over-
identifying restrictions fails to reject. There-
fore, the Sargan test statistics indicates that 
all specifications are well specified and that 
the instrument vector is appropriate. The 
instrument rank of 11 is greater than the 
number of estimated coefficients (6, 7 and 8) 
also give the same conclusion. 
The researcher also investigates the di-
rection of causality between poverty and 
corruption. If the null hypothesis of no cau-
sality is rejected, then one may conclude that 
corruption causes poverty. The empirical 
evidence in Table 2 shows that poverty does 
not cause corruption, meanwhile corruption 
causes poverty. Since the result confidently 
confirms that only corruption causes pov-
erty, whereas poverty does not cause corrup-
tion, we do not need to test the corruption 
equation.  
Corruption could affect directly the 
poor since it lead to increase the prices of 
public services, lower quantity and quality 
of public services, hamper poor people’s 
access public services (health care, water, 
sanitation, education and other public ser-
vices). It also might deform poor people’s 
relationship with and trust for public offi-
cials, the police and people in authority 
who force bribes from them. Corruption 
also affects indirectly through lowering 
economic growth, reinforcing income ine-
quality, distorting public expenditure allo-
cation. In macro level, corruption has im-
plications for a country’s ability to attract 
investment, for the effectiveness of its insti-
tutions, for income generation through taxa-
tion and hence in the economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
As the focus of this study is on capability 
poverty using the HDI, it can be generalized 
that, empirically, corruption affects poverty, 
but poverty does not affect corruption. 
Hence, it is necessary to address the inte-
grated strategies to alleviate poverty and 
corruption. In other words, the attempts to 
reduce poverty must be complemented by 
serious efforts to reduce corruption.  
In addition to the finding above, this 
study suggests strategy to attempt to reduc-
ing corruption. If it is carefully crafted, anti-
corruption programs might yield important 
poverty reduction, especially if they are fol-
lowed by increasing economic growth, creat-
ing more equitable income distribution, 
strengthening governance institutions and 
capacity, improving government services 
especially in health and education, and also 
increasing public trust in government 
(Chetwynd et al. 2003).  
Table 3 
Granger Causality Tests Results 
 
Hypotheses Model 
Corruption does not cause Poverty 4.801 
(0.01)*** 
Poverty does not cause Corruption 1.979 
(0.15) 
Numbers in parentheses are P-value of the statistics. A triple asterisk is an indication of significance at 
the 1% level. 
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Finally, to reduce corruption, the strate-
gies also need action on at least four fronts 
(Tanzi 1998): (i) Honest and visible com-
mitment by leadership to fight against cor-
ruption. The leadership must zero tolerance 
for it; (ii) Policy changes that reduce the 
demand for corruption by scaling down reg-
ulations and other policies such as tax incen-
tives and by making those that are retained 
as transparent and as no-discretionary as 
possible. Discretion must be kept to the min-
imum; (iii) Reducing the supply of corrup-
tion by increasing public sector wages, by 
increasing incentives toward honest behav-
ior, and by instituting effective controls and 
penalties on public servants; and (iv) Some-
how solving the problem of the financing of 
political parties. 
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Table 4 
Sources and Characteristics of Sample Data 
 
Variables Unit of Meas. 
Abbrevia
tion Mean SD Min Max 
Data 
Source 
Corruption Perception Index 0-10 CPI 3.57 2.15 1.3 9.3 TI 
Inflation % Inflation 6.63 7.18 -0.8 35 World Bank
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
% Gender 43.13 48.45 34.99 50.58 UNCTAD 
Human Development Index % HDI 0.68 0.14 0.44 0.94 UNDP 
  
